



Exterior of vehicle showing canvas covers on windows and spool of wire on right rear.

spliced into the wire, allows the platoon's wire communications net to be set up within minutes of arrival. This hot loop attaches to the TA-312 telephone mounted inside the vehicle. The vehicle panels immediately behind the driver and passenger doors

were replaced with plywood doors to provide additional storage space for the crew's rucksacks, rations, water cans, and fuel cans.

All of these modifications to the HMMWV were completed in less than 40 man-hours, and all materials, with

the exception of the swing-arm lamp, were obtained through the supply system. An additional AN/GRC-160 radio (with a secure capability) was added to the FDC vehicle not only to allow the platoon to operate on the battalion command net but also to give a built-in redundancy if the FDC has to be used as the alternate battalion TOC.

This FDC vehicle effectively fills the needs of the battalion's mortar platoon. The FDC now has a place for everything, and when fully loaded, everything is in its place. The final product is a highly mobile, versatile, and efficient fire direction center that is easily deployable, cost effective, and built for the sustainment of combat operations.

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Resistance to Interrogation

CAPTAIN P. J. MULLINGS, British Army

If a soldier suddenly finds himself a prisoner of war, his first reaction usually is incredulity. He says, "This is not possible." But possible it certainly is. At this point, he is suffering from what is known as "the shock of capture."

Nobody has ever told him much about what to expect if he is captured. He may have been told that

only Special Forces and Rangers need to concern themselves with that sort of thing. He may have heard someone mention the Geneva conventions and name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, but it's all a little vague. Anyway, what does it matter? He doesn't have any information of value anyway.

It seems a shame that highly trained,

well motivated troops are so sadly lacking in training in "conduct after capture," as it is called in the British Army. How ironic for a highly trained paratrooper floating earthward, adrenaline pumping, ready to go "all the way" to land in the teeth of the enemy and find that his training stops there.

The shock of capture is not a disease

that can be prevented, but a little knowledge of its existence may help soldiers overcome what can turn out to be the most dramatic part of the war for them.

The idea of interrogation usually conjures up visions of the Spanish Inquisition and Vietnam era newsreels showing pallid, sunken-eyed pilots running a gauntlet of rabble-raised peasants. Or mental pictures of terrorist-type "Black and Decker" knee jobs and the connection of electric cattle prods to the testicles.

But these preconceived ideas could not be further from the truth. Torture causes pain, and a soldier in pain will concentrate on it to the exclusion of everything else until he will eventually say anything at all to make it stop. This gives the interrogator the onerous task of separating fact from fiction. Therefore, an interrogator may use the psychological fear of pain instead, because the fear is more effective than the actual pain.

No, the days of torture are long gone in real terms, as are the days of drugs and hypnosis. Today's military tactical questioner may speak impeccable English and will have done his homework. He will be able to identify a "talker" quickly and begin the conditioning process. His first step will be to ensure that the shock of capture is maintained, using various methods—cold, squalid conditions; deprivation of food and sleep; stressful positions; and loud, electronic squeal (white noise) in between periods of silence.

Under the terms of the Geneva conventions, and in particular the one that deals with the treatment of prisoners of war, the only information a prisoner is required to give is his number, rank, name, and date of birth (commonly known in the British Army as "The Big Four"). Thus, "What is your date of birth?" can elicit an answer, but "How old are you?" cannot, even though the meaning is quite similar. A soldier who does answer the latter question finds himself on the slippery slope to the next unauthorized question.

It is important to remember that tell-

ing lies is almost invariably unsuccessful, mainly because one lie leads to another and the liar, even in ideal conditions, needs a good memory. Therefore, under stress it is virtually impossible to lie and get away with it (as most of us can recall from incidents in childhood).

A safe answer to all other questions is "I cannot answer that question, Sir (Madam)." (This response is British policy.) In this context, "cannot" could mean "will not because I am stubborn," or "cannot because I do not know," or "cannot because the Geneva convention says I do not have to." "Cannot" is therefore a word weapon on the soldier's side. He can be absolutely certain that any experienced interrogator will know this and will try to short circuit his system.

In real terms, even though the information a soldier knows may be low level, it will be of value in the short

A prisoner is a tongue.

(Old Polish Proverb)

term, so the interrogator has to work fast. To get this information, he will use a variety of ploys, including the following:

Threats. He may threaten all manner of atrocities and inhuman treatment or may try to get a reaction by threatening the soldier's family.

Insults. Going for the soldier's integrity as an officer or accusing him of cowardice is a sure-fire method of getting a reaction, as is calling his wife a whore.

Blackmail. He may threaten to tell the soldier's comrades that he has talked or threaten to have one of them shot if the soldier does not tell what he knows.

Sympathy. This is a useful technique, especially if the soldier has a wound that requires medical attention or has some other pressing personal need.

Of course, there are innumerable

other techniques an interrogator may use. This means that an important question must be asked: How much training in resisting interrogation, and what type of training, is every one of our soldiers entitled to?

There can be no doubt that the practical application of this sort of training can be dangerous in the wrong hands. Accordingly, all practical training must be conducted under strict medical supervision, because it is not for the fainthearted. To those who are considering this problem in the warmth and relative security of their homes or offices and saying to themselves, "I'd never talk," just try it for a few hours and then try to tell your brains that it is only an exercise.

Although the practical side has hurdles that must be overcome, theoretical training is possible. With a little imagination, a knowledge of the subject, and a liberal smattering of training aids and films, much can be achieved. This kind of training will not eliminate capitulators (willing or unwilling), but it will open the door to awareness at all levels. Hopefully, soldiers will at least be able to recall this valuable part of their training and will remain aware of what is happening to them from the first stages of capture, through their initial screening and questioning, and finally to the prisoner of war camp.

The modern-day experiences of captives such as those held in Lebanon may tell us more. Although one might suppose that a terrorist will not abide by conventions, he will apply the same principles. Knowing that, there is much a prisoner can do to alleviate the mental pressure exerted by a captor.

As one example, in the early 1970s the British Ambassador to Uruguay, Geoffrey H.S. Jackson, was held captive by Tupemaro guerrillas. He had warned both the Foreign Office and his wife that he felt he was about to become a hostage and made his wife promise to leave the country as soon as she knew he had been taken. This she did, and it deprived the guerrillas of a lever; no matter how many times the ambassador's captors told him that

she was also a captive, he knew that she was safe in England and he was therefore able to resist the pressure. (Ambassador Jackson's book *People's Prison* makes interesting reading.)

Every single officer and soldier from the task force commander to the chaplain's assistant has a right to be told what to expect if he is taken pris-

oner and what he can do to resist the many and varied interrogation techniques that will be used against him. With the advent of advanced collective training facilities such as the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center, maybe we should come to terms with this fact and make room in this training to practice (in a controlled environment) this most

important part of our soldiers' training.

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Chemical Warfare

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The prospect of fighting on a chemical battlefield is still viewed with horror by many soldiers and commanders alike. But this perception may be based upon a general misunderstanding of the *why* of chemical warfare. It has been established that chemical weapons are a major threat only to those who are unprepared for their introduction on the battlefield, as has been the case, for example, in Southeast Asia, South Yemen, Iran, and Afghanistan.

In order to prepare himself and his unit to meet this eventuality, an infantry commander needs to understand certain basics in regard to infantry operations in a chemical environment -- how to avoid contamination, how to protect his men and equipment against chemical agents, and how to decontaminate them.

Contamination Avoidance

Avoiding contamination, whenever it is tactically feasible, is the most important principle for a unit to follow when it operates in a chemical environment, because this allows for

continued operations at a reduced level of mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP). The longer soldiers can avoid using their protective masks, the more functional they will be and the less physiologically stressed. Avoidance will also, obviously, preclude time-consuming decontamination.

The first step in avoiding contamination is to present the least attractive target to the enemy. This requires stringent communication security and full attention to the passive defensive measures of dispersion, cover, and concealment. Anything a unit can do to avoid detection is important to its survival.

The basics of avoiding contamination are detecting it through advance warning and reporting, identifying it through chemical reconnaissance, and then marking it so that other units can also avoid it.

Advance contamination warnings can be obtained through various nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reports, starting with the basic NBC-1 (Chemical) Report and progressing to the more detailed NBC-5 (Chemical) Report. These reports identify when and where a unit

was attacked and the limits of any subsequent chemical contamination. A simple and workable NBC warning and reporting system can be used to inform all subordinate, neighboring, and higher units of a chemical attack or the results of a chemical survey (Figure 1).

The proper use of such a warning and reporting system can do much to save a unit valuable resources and time, because it gives advanced predictions of chemical hazards and enables a commander and his staff to make intelligent decisions on tactical movements and logistical support.

As for chemical reconnaissance, any unit that has an M256A1 chemical detection kit can do it. This kit is dispatched with a unit's advance party or lead elements in tactical situations, since chemical reconnaissance should be considered an ongoing operation along with tactical maneuvering and day-to-day unit employments.

Additionally, all reconnaissance efforts should consider chemical as well as nuclear and biological contamination as part of the overall mission. This will give a unit an incentive to identify the potential threat and will